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In tlte Sttpreme Cottrt of tlte 
State of Utah 
R. BYRON FERGUSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
J. OSCAR GARRETT and 
STELLA P. GARRETI, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. \ 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
CASE 
NO. 7257 
For the most part we accept the statement of case as 
made by counsel in plaintiff's brief. We desire, however, 
to add thereto the following particulars. This is a suit for 
damages brought by plaintiff against defendants for breach 
of the provision in Exhibit "A", which reads "possession 
given in 90 days." This Earnest Money Agreement shows 
on its face that there are three housing units located on 
the premises described therein, which were (1) the home, 
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(2) the store building, and (3) the three unit apartment 
house. 
In order to found his claim the plaintiff alleged in his 
complaint the negotiations prior to and contemporaneous 
with Exhibit "A": that plaintiff in formed defendants that 
he was engaged in the coal trucking business, operating a 
farm, and feeding some beef cattle; that he had been in-
jured and was no longer able to perform heavy work and 
therefore desired to buy defendants' property in order that 
he could engage in the operation of a grocery and meat 
business in a store located thereon, and that it was neces-
sary for plaintiff to sell his home, trucking business and 
farm in order to raise money for the purchase of defend-
ants' property and the establishment of the grocery busi-
ness thereon. The plaintiff further alleges that there was 
a tenant occupying the store building on defendants' premi-
ses at the time of these negotiations, and that defendants 
represented to the plaintiff that this tenant occupied the 
store building on a month to month tenancy which could 
and would be terminated within 90 days; that pursuant to 
this understanding, the plaintiff and defendants entered 
into the written agreement dated July 29, 1946, Exhibit 
"A"; that after the signing of this agreement and in reli-
ance thereon, plaintiff sold his home, trucking business and 
farm, and on November 1, 1946, moved into the home lo-
cated on defendants' premises and also moved equipment 
for the grocery store onto the premises, but that the pos-
session of the store building hos not been delivered to plain-
tiff4 The plaintiff then alleges the provisions of Exhibits 
'·'A", "B" and "C", and special damages for the claimed 
failure of defendants to deliver possession of the store. 
The defendants, in their answer, while admitting the 
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execution of Exhibits "A", "B", and "C", deny the negotia-
tions leading up thereto as alleged by the plaintiff, and par-
ticUlarly that they informed the plaintiff that the tenant 
in possession of the store was leasing the building from 
month to month, or that he could or would be removed from 
the store within 90 days; defendants then go on in their af-
firmative defense and allege their version of the negotia-
tions leading up to the making of the contract, Exhibit 
"A", and particularly with respect to the matter of the de-
livery of possession of the store building; defendants fur-
ther allege that the negotiations between the parties con-
tinued over a period of seven weeks, and that on July 15, 
1948, they advised plaintiff that Haddock had possession 
of the store; that defendants would be unable to remove 
Haddock, and that if sale was made plaintiff would have 
to take possession of the store subject to Haddocl<'s rights 
under the lease; that plaintiff, so advised, agreed that if de-
fendants would sell their property to him he would assume 
the obligation of getting Haddock out of the store ;that 
pursuant to this agreement by plaintiff, defendants signed 
Exhibits "A" and "B", and on August 3, 1946, notified Had-
dock plaintiff was the new owner, and that he would pay 
rent to him after November 1, 1946; that on November 1, 
1946, defendants delivered the entire premises, including 
the store, to plaintiff, subject to Haddock's lease rights in 
the store; that plaintiff went to Haddock after the agree-
ment was signed and demanded possession of the store buil-
ding, which the tenant refused to grant; that after plain-
tiff advised defendants of this, they offered to call the whole 
deal off until Haddock's lease expired; that again plaintiff 
advised defendants that he was not worried and could get 
Haddock out of the store building in 30 days, and that 
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plaintiff wanted to go through with the deal; that subse-
quently plaintiff demanded that defendants get possession 
of the store building from Haddock, claiming that his law-
yer had informed him that defendants were obliged so to 
do under the agreement; that when plaintiff was reminded 
by defendant of his agreement to accept possession of store 
building subject to Haddock's lease, he told them that he 
had changed his mind; and that defendants have fully per-
formed their agreement and delivered possession of the 
premises, including the store building, to plaintiff in accord-
ance with the agreement, and that if plaintiff suffered any 
damage, it was not due to any failure of defendants, but 
the result of plaintiff's breach of his agreement to accept 
possession subject to Haddock's lease rights in the store. 
Plaintiff, having alleged in his complaint his version of the 
conversations and negotiations leading up to the signing of 
the agreement, filed a lengthy motion to strike, (R-27 to 
30) whereby he seeks to strike all of the allegations con-
tained in the answer of defendants, which set forth their 
version of the negotiations leading up to the making of the 
agreement. The motion to strike, as well as the demurrer 
of the plaintiff, was denied (R-46). 
The principal issues raised by these pleadings are: (1) 
Was plaintiff induced to enter into the agreement by the 
representation that defendants could and would deliver pos-
session of the store building within 90 days after the date 
thereof? (2) Did plaintiff inform the defendants that he 
was counting on possession of the store building within 90 
days in order to start his grocery business therein? ( 3) 
What was the agreement with respect to the possession of 
the store building? 
At the trial plaintiff was allowed to go into the con-
1 ( 
I 
I 
1 
i' I. 
I 
I. 
( 
I 
I 
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j. 
I 
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versations with the defendants constituting the negotia-
tions prior to the execution of the contract, and fully gave 
evidence of his version thereof. When defendants offered 
evidence of their version of the conversations constituting 
the negotiations leading up to the making of the agreement, 
the plaintiff assailed their right to do so, and invoked the 
parol evidence rule to sustain his position. The Court over-
ruled the objection and permitted defendants to give their 
version of the negotiations. 
At the conclusion of the trial, and after the matter 
was fully argued, the Court made findings of fact on the 
material issues raised by the pleadings and entered judg-
ment thereon in favor of the defendants and against the 
plaintiff, "no cause of action" (R-50 to 55). Plaintiff takes 
this appeal assigning error to the trial court for (1) refus-
ing to strike defendants' answer allegations of the oral ne-
gotiations leading up to the execution of the written con-
tract, (2) admitting oral evidence of these negotiations 
when offered by defendants, (3) making findings and judg-
ment which are not supported by competent evidence or 
the law, and (4) failure to admit evidence offered by plain-
tiff as to special damages. 
THE ARGUMENT 
It should first be observed that the plaintiff predicates 
his claimed error almost entirely on the position that the 
"parol evidence rule" has been violated in that an attempt 
has been made to vary the terms of the written agreement, 
Exhibit "A." The assignments may be generally grouped 
as (1) An attack on defendants' answer alleging their ver-
sion of the oral negotiations leading to the execution of the 
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contract, (2) The evidence admitted at the trial supporting 
those oral negotiations, and (3) That the findings and judg-
ment made by the Court are not supported by competent 
evidence. Counsel, in their brief (Br. 7) state the funda-
mental issue on this appeal as: "Is parol evidence compe-
tent to vary the terms of a written contract for the sale of 
real estate and of a statutory warranty deed given to con-
summate such contract?" We do not believe this to be the 
principal issue as drawn by the pleadings in this case. Rath-
er it is our position that the basic issue here is: Does the 
parol evidence rule preclude the parties from showing by 
oral evidence the agreement respecting possession of the 
store made prior to or contemporaneous with the written 
contract? Plaintiff sues defendants for failing to give him 
possession of the store within 90 days under the written con-
tract. Apparently plaintiff could not determine from the 
contract itself what the possession provision thereof meant, 
for he alleged in paragraph 3A of his complaint that "The 
defendants represented and stated to plaintiff that said 
tenant occupied said store building on a month to month 
l 
( 
( 
! 
I 
' 
tenancy which tenancy could and would be terminated by ( 
defendants and the possession of said store building could · i 
and would be delivered to the plaintiff by the defendants I : 
within 90 days after the signing of the agreement" (R-2). 
Defendants denied this, and in their answer alleged in para-
graph 2, page 4, "That during those negotiations and on or 1 
about July 15, 1946, defendants advised plaintiff that one 
Haddock had possession of the store building situated on I ; 
said premises under a lease, and that defendants would be 
unable to remove said ·tenant, and if the sale was made 
:plaintiff would have to take possession of said store subject 
to tenant's rights under said lease. That the plaintiff, be-
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ing so advised and fully informed concerning said Haddock 
lease on the store building, then and there undertook and 
agreed that if defendants would sell said premises to him 
that he would assume the obligation of getting the Had-
docks out of the store ..... " (R-22). 
Clearly then, under the pleadings the issue became: 
\Vhat was the prior oral agreement respecting delivery of 
possession' of the store? The agreement in this regard, 
which plaintiff attempts to show is a collateral one to the 
written agreement in question. Indeed, plaintiff's whole 
case rests upon the oral agreement made between these par-
ties proir to or contemporaneous with the written contract 
in question, as does defendants' defense thereto. Both par-
ties claim that this prior oral agreement was the induce-
ment held out to each of them to enter into the written 
agreement. Both parties were allowed to give evidence on 
this matter, the plaintiff: That the defendants represented 
to him that the tenant could and would be removed from 
the store within 90 days and plaintiff given possession,-
the defendants: That plaintiff represented that if they 
would sell to him he would accept possession of the store 
subject to the tenant's rights. The Court heard all the evi-
dence and found generally in accordance with the defend-
ant's version of the prior oral agreement. We contend that 
the Court's action in do doing did not offend against the 
parol evidence rule. 
We have no quarrel with the parol evidence rule as 
set out in counsel's brief and the Utah cases they cite sus-
atining it. We shall call attention, however, to certain ex-
ceptions or areas where the rule has no application. Our 
position is that there is no error in the trial court's ruling 
either on the motion to strike, the admission of evidence, 
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or the making of findings and judgment, because the parol 
evidence rule has no . application to the issues in this case 
as drawn by the pleadings. We base our position upon the 
three legal propositions to follow: 
I. THE PLAINTIFF, HAVING ALLEGED AND 
GIVEN EVIDENCE OF THE ORAL AGREEMENT AS 
TO POSSESSION OF THE STORE PRIOR TO THE EXE-
OUTION OF THE WRI'ITEN CONTRACT, THIE DE-
FENDANTS ARE NOT PRECLUDED BY THE PAROL 
EVIDENCE RULE FROM ALLEGING AND GIVING 
EVIDENCE OF THEIR VERSION OF THIS ORAL 
AGREEMENT. 
As indicated above, it_ was paintiff who, in his plead-
ings and proof, opened up the prior oral agreement with 
respect to the possession of the store, and this regardless 
of the provision in the written contract "possession given 
in 90 days." However, when defendants attempt to allege 
their version of the same prior oral agreement as to pos-
session of the store and give evidence in support thereof, 
the plaintiff invokes the parol evidence rule as a barrier 
to defendants doing so. It is true that counsel concede (Br. 
24) that defendants would have right to deny plaintiff's 
allegations concerning the prior oral agreement, but it is 
contended that the denial would go no farther than the 
special damage matter. In effect, counsel contend that 
plaintiff can allege and prove a prior oral agreement con-
cerning possession of the store, the breach of which he 
claims entitled him to damages, but that by means of the 
parol evidence rule he can preclude the defendants from 
either alleging or proving their version of the same oral 
agreement in defense. Plaintiff's position is untenable, and 
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the law is against him. The general rule of law governing 
such a case is stated in 2 Jones on Evidence, 4th Ed., sec-
tion 434, at page 824: 
"An apparent departure from the rule is presen-
ted by the practice whereby, if one party is permitted 
to introduce extrinsic evidence to vary a written con-
tract, his adversary is permitted to resort to such evi-
dence to uphold the contract, even though it tends to 
vary or contradict the words of the writing which he 
seeks to support." 
The rule was applied in Richeson, et al, v. Wood, 158 
Va. 269, 163 S. E. 339, 82 A. L. R. 1189. This was a suit 
on a written contract claimed by the defendant to be usuri-
ous. The defendant borrower gave oral evidence as to usu-
ry, and attempted to bar the plaintiff from giving oral evi-
dence in the support of the legality of the contract by plead-
ing the parol evidence rule. The court, in holding that pa-
rol evidence rule did not preclude such evidence, had the 
following to say: 
"When, however, the borrower has alleged and in-
troduced evidence tending to prove that a written con-
tract, legal on its face, was in fact illegal in its incep-
tion, because executed by him for an usurious consid-
eration, upon that issue, the lender, or other party 
seeking to support the legality of the contract, may, 
without violating the parol evidence rule, introduce 
any competent extrinsic evidence, which is relevant 
and material to show that the contract was in fact exe-
cuted for a legal consideration. And this is true though 
such evidence may tend to vary or contradict the terms 
of or recitals in the written instrument, or tend to 
prove a consideration different from either that ex-
pressed in the contract, or alleged by the borrower." 
(A. L. R. p. 1195). 
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"The rule above announced is also consonant with 
the rule that where one party has been permitted to 
introduce extrinsic evidence of the facts and circum-
stances leading up to and connected with the execu-
tion of a written contract, the other party may intro-
duce evidence as to the same matters, notwithstanding 
that the evidence offered by him tends to vary or con-
tradict the writing. 22 C. J. (Evidence) p. 1295, and 
cases there cited in note 96." (A. L. R. p. 1197). 
See also 20 Am. Jur. 964 and 1013, citing Bogk v. Gas-
sert, 149 U. S. 17, 37 L. Ed. 631, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 738. In 
that case the plaintiffs sued defendant Bogk upon a lease of 
certain premises in Butte, Montana, praying for judgment 
of restitution and damages. At the trial defendant Bogk 
gave evidence of conversations had with the plaintiffs lead-
ing up to the execution of the lease and which showed that 
the transaction respecting the real property covered by the 
lease was to mortgage same to the plaintiffs rather than 
to sell it to them. The plaintiffs were allowed in rebuttal 
of this testimony of defendant Bogk to give their version 
of the conversations leading up to the making of the lease. 
It was objected that it was error to allow plaintiff to so 
testify in view of the. Montana Statute, which embodies the 
common law' providing that parol evidence shall not be 
admitted to show the terms of agreements that have been 
reduced to writing except in cases of ambiguity, mistake, 
or: fraud. The Supreme Court, in holding that there was no 
error and affirming the judgment of the lower court, had 
the following to say on this point: 
"In rebuttal, Steel and Gassert were put upon the 
stand and asked as to the conversation which took 
place at the attorney's office at the time the deeds and 
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contract to reconvey were made. This conversation 
was admitted, and defendant excepted. Now, while 
this might have been improper as original testimony, 
it would have been manifestly unfair to permit Bogk 
to give his version of the transaction, gathered from 
conversation between the parties, and to deny the 
plaintiffs the privilege of giving their version of it. The 
defendant himself, having thrown the bars down, has 
evidently no right to object to the plaintiffs having 
taken advantage of the license thereby given to sub-
mit to the jury their understanding of the agreement. 
The Code is merely in affirmance of the common law 
rule, and was evidently not intended to apply to a case 
of this kind." (Sup. Ct. Rep., p. 740). 
The plaintiff in the case at bar, having opened up the 
matter of the prior oral agreement which led up to the exe-
cution of the written contract in question, cannot thereafter 
preclude the defendants from pleading and proving their 
version of the oral agreement by relying on the parol evi-
dence rule. Neither can counsel at this late date say that 
"nowhere in the complaint does the plaintiff question the 
fact that the written instruments constitute the complete 
agreement." How about the above mentioned quotation 
from plaintiff's complaint? It makes no difference what 
purpose plaintiff had in mind in going into the oral agree• 
·e: ment prior to the execution of the written contract. The 
law is that if he does so, he cannot thereafter preclude the 
defendants from pleading their version of the same. 
II. THE PLAINTIFF, HAVING MADE A COLLAT-
ERAL ORAL AGREEMENT AS TO POSSESSION OF 
THE STORE PRIOR TO AND AS AN INDUCEMENT 
FOR DEFENDANTS TO ENTER INTO THE WRITTEN 
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CONTRACT, THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE DOES NOT 
PREVENT ADMITTING ORAL EVIDENCE SHOWING 
WHAT THE COLLATERAL AGREEMENT WAS. 
As indicated above, plaintiff, in his complaint and by 
oral evidence supporting it, claims that prior to the exe-
cution of the written agreement, the defendants repre-
sented to him that they could and would get the ten 
ant out of the store and deliver possession of same to 
plaintiff within 90 days. The defendants, denying this, 
claim by pleadings and proof that plaintiff represented to 
them that he would be willing to take possession of the store 
within 90 days and agreed to do it subject to the rights of 
the tenant. Both parties respectively claim that the rep-
resentation made to each by the other was the inducement 
for the entering into and execution of the written contract 
in question. Under these circumstances, can plaintiff, by 
pleading the parol evidence rule, cut off the right of the 
defendants to assert in pleadings and proof their right to 
show what the prior oral inducement agreement was? The 
law is clear on this point and generally is to the effect that 
the plaintiff cannot orally represent that he would accept 
the premises subject to the Haddock lease in order to in-
duce the defendants to enter into a written contract, and 
then come into court and hide behind the parol evidence 
rule to preclude the defendants from showing what the 
oral representations were prior to the making of the writ-
ten contract. The general rule of law is sta~ed in 32 C. J. 
s., p. 970. 
"Th~ parol evidence rule does not preclude the ad-
mission of extrinsic evidence of a valid or prior con-
temporaneous parol agreement which is collateral both 
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in form and substance in that, although related in a 
general sense to the written instrument in question,_ it 
is independent thereof and does not vary or contradic~ 
the express or implied provisions thereof nor invade 
the particular field which the instrument undertakes 
expressly or impliedly to cover, but instead has for its 
subject a matter which the parties might naturally 
deal with separately." 
"Generally speaking, a collateral agreement which 
constituted part of the consideration for a written 
agreement, or operated as an inducement for entering 
into it, may be shown by parol evidence; but there is 
some divergence of authority as to the limitations of 
the rule.'' 
See also 22 C. J., page 1253, and cases cited in note 
40; 20 Am. Jur. section 1141, page 994, citing cases in note 
13, one of which is Frederick v. Ludwig, 112 Okla. 217, 240 
Pac. 1049. In that case the suit was on some promissory 
notes. These notes had been executed by defendants in 
settlement of an a·ccount which had run between plaintiffs 
and defendants over· a long period of time. At the trial, 
defendants offered to show an oral agreement whereby the 
plaintiff agreed that if the amount of the notes was not 
correct because· of errors made in computing the account,' 
that "he would correct any errors and credit them on the 
- note." This evidence was objected to on the grounds that 
the parol evidence rule prevented its being received. The 
Court excluded the evidence, but on appeal this was held 
to be reversible error. The Court cites with approval 10 
R. C. L. 1059, which is as follows: 
"The evidence of a contemporaneous parol agree-
ment between the parties under the influence of which 
note • * * or contract has been signed, which is 
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violated as soon as it has accomplished its purpose in 
securing the execution of the paper, may always be 
shown when the enforcement of the paper is attemp-
ted." 
The same doctrine was applied in McGregor v. Far-
mers'-Merchants Bank & Trust Co., et al (1935) 180 Wash. 
440, 40 P2d. 144. McGregor brought the action to estab-
lish a preferred claim against the general funds of the de-
fendant bank in liquidation. McGregor had a check pay-
able to himself for $1,000.00 drawn on Coffman-Dobson 
Bank. He endorsed and presented the check to the defend-
ant bank requesting payment in $50.00 bills. The cashier 
advised McGregor that he only had $500.00 in $50.00 bills 
on hand and requested McGregor to take those bills and de-
posit the remainder with the bank, which plaintiff refused 
to do. It was then agreed between McGrgor and the cash-
ier that plaintiff should take $500.00 in $50.00 bills and that 
the bank should hold the remaining sum of $500.00 and ex-
change it for $50.00 bills as soon as convenient and prompt-
ly notify respondent when the exchange had been made. 
McGregor then requested a receipt for the $500.00 repre-
sented by the uncollected portion of the $1,000.00 check. 
In response to the request, the cashier drew a cashier's 
check for $500.00 payable to Charles McGregor, absolute 
and in negotiable form. The check was handed to McGre-
gor by the cashier with the statement that it "was the same 
as a receipt," or that it "would answer the same purpose 
as a receipt." McGregor did not question the statement, 
but took the cashier's word for it. The bank collected the 
$1,000.00 check but did not notify McGregor that it had 
obtained the $50.00 bills, and before plaintiff could call at 
l 
( 
I 
I 
I 
l 
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the bank, it was taken over by the State Banking D,epart-
ment as an insolvent concern. McGregor presented a pre-
ferred claim to the supervisor in charge of the bank, but 
the latter denied it as such and allowed it only as a general 
claim. Whereupon this action was instituted. At the trial 
McGregor was allowed to prove the oral agreement with 
the cashier of the bank that the cashier's check was mere-
ly a receipt. This proof was allowed over the objection of 
the defendant that the parol evidence rule prevented the 
receipt of such evidence on the grounds that it varied the 
terms of the cashier's check, which was absolute in form. 
On appeal the judgment of the trial court was affirmed and 
the plaintiff was permitted to recover the $500.00 as a pre-
ferred claim. The opinion is concerned with the parol evi-
dence rule question raised on the appeal. In this regard 
the Court had the following to say: 
"Certain exceptions to the rule are as firmly es-
tablished as the rule itself. In fact, they may be said 
to be a part of the rule. We mention only one or two 
of the exceptions, which we conceive to be applicable 
here. One is that, where a parol contemporaneous 
agreement is the inducing and moving cause of a writ-
ten contract, or where a parol agreement forms part 
of the consideration for a written contract, and it ap-
pears that the written contract was executed on the 
faith of the parol contract or representations, then 
such evidence is admissible. 3 Jones on Evidence (2d 
Ed.) par. 1492 ..... " 
"But it clearly appears from the evidence that the 
acceptance of the check was induced by a contempor-
aneous parol agreement which went to the very heart 
of the consideration. Though the check was absolute 
in form and was manually delivered, it was given and 
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accepted upon the express condition that it was to rep-
resent a fund that was at all times to belong to re-
spondent. As to $500 of the proceeds to be derived 
from the collection of the $1,000 check, the bank was 
not .to mingle that amount with its general funds, but 
was to convert it into $50 bills to be held for respond-
ent. The situation was exactly the same as though 
respondent had left with the bank $500 in silver or in 
. small denominations of currency to be converted into 
ten bills of $50 each and held for him in its converted 
form. Certainly, in the latter instance, it would be con-
sidered as a trust fund." 
. The terms of the check were not, 
under the peculiar circumstances, inconsistent with the 
contemporaneous agreement between the parties. The 
parol agreement was separate and distinct from the 
agreement implied by the check. Although an agree- ( 
. ment between parties is reduced to writing, the law , .. 
does not merge into the writing prior or contempor-
aneous agreements which are distinct, valid, and not 
in conflict with the writing. 3 Jones on Evidence (2d 
..... ':~~.: :_ 
ed.) sec. 1440, p. 2712. The contemporaneous agree-
ment did not, in this instance, become merged in the 
agreement· implied by the check." 
In such ea:se it is not necessary to allege that the oral 
agreement was omitted because of fraud, accident, or mis-
taake, as is shown by Champlin v. Transport Motor Com-
pany (1934) 177Wash. 659, 33 P2d 82. In that case, the 
plaintiff, who was a salesm~n of the defendant, entered into 
a contemporaneous oral agreement with defendant that de-
fendant wouid hold plaintiff harmless in financing a new 
c~~ :_. ·~ :~lying. upqn ··• t!J.i~. :or~l. arrangement, plai~tiff bought 
a new car, turned his old one in on same, and signed a con-
ditional. -sales .agreement to complete the transaction. It 
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17 
was never intended that plaintiff should pay anything for 
the new car because defendant was to resell same at the 
end of six months and pay up the balance on the contract. 
Just before the six months period expired, the finance com-
pany repossessed plaintiff's car and turned it over to the 
defendant. The plaintiff sued for the damages he had sus-
tained and defendant strenuously objected to any evidence 
concerning the oral agreement on the grounds that it vio-
lated the parol evidence rule. The evidence was allowed 
and plaintiff recovered judgment for $500 against defend-
ant. The judgment was affirmed on appeal, the Supreme 
Court having the following comments to make, page 8v: 
"The chief contention of appellant is that the trial 
court erred in allowing the parol evidence, in that it 
alters the written contract heretofore mentioned and 
violates the parol evidence rule. In furtherance of this 
contention appellant also contends that the trial court 
refused to make a finding of fraud, mistake, or intimi· 
dation, so that this case cannot rest upon the ground 
of fraud inducing the contract. 
"It is true that the trial court said that there was 
no fraud, or intimidation, and no such words were used 
in the amended complaint of respondent, which is un-
important. 
''The amended complaint was . founded upon the 
collateral oral agreement between the parties, based 
upon adequate consideration, which was the induce-
ment for the written contract of- sale of the Hupmo-
bile car. 
"'The rule admitting parol evidence of a collateral 
agreement is especially applicable where such agree-
ment constituted a part of the consideration of the 
written agreement, or operated as an inducement for 
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entering into it, "" * * It has also been held that, 
where, at the time of executing a writing, a stipula-
tion has been entered into, a condition annexed, or a 
promise made by word of mouth, on the faith of which 
the writing has been executed, parol evidnce of such 
matters is admissible even though it may vary or ma-
terially change the terms of the contract; and in such 
case it is not necessary to allege that the agreement 
was left out of the contract through fraud, accident, 
or mistake.' 22 C. J. 1254." 
The case at bar is one wherein the oral evidence was 
alleged, offered, and received, not for the purpose of vary-
ing the terms of the written contract but rather for the 
purpose of showing what the inducement was for the en-
tering into such written contract as evidenced by the prior 
collateral oral agreement. It is submitted that such action 
does not offend against the parol evidence rule. 
III. THE WRITIEN CONTRACT BEING AMBIGU-
OUS ON ITS FACE WITH RESPECT TO POSSESSION 
OF THE STORE, THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE DOES 
NOT PRECLUDE ORAL EVIDENCE BEING R.ECEIVED 
TO ASCERTAIN THE MEANING OF THE PROVISION 
THEREIN, "POSSESSION GIVEN IN 90 DAYS." 
Attention is called to the fact that the term "possession 
gicen in 90 days" contained in the written contract is am-
biguous and uncertain and this appears on the face of the 
agreement itself. It appears from the agreement that the 
instrument calls for the sale of a home, a store building, 
and an apartment house consisting of three units. The pro-
vision . concerning possession is modified definitely by the 
further provision "seller to occupy North apartment for 
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two years rent free." The fact that there are two of the 
apartment house units and the store occupied by tenants 
throws serious doubt as to the meaning of the provision 
concerning "possession given in 90 days." This ambiguity 
is not removed by the supplemental agreement, Exhibit 
"B", nor by the Warranty Deed subsequently given, Ex-
hibit "C". The ambiguity was clearly recognized by plain-
tiff before he brought suit against the defendants for the 
breach of the possession provision. This is clearly evi-
denced by the allegations of the complaint and the proof 
offered by plaintiff at the trial. If it were not so, why did 
not the plaintiff declare upon the written contract and its 
· provisions respecting possession, without going into the oral 
agreement between the parties prior to the execution of 
the written contract. No doubt it was because plaintiff was 
unable to tell from the face of the written instrument what 
possession under the written contract meant,-whether pos-
session meant actual delivery to plaintiff of the store, the 
two apartments and the home unoccupied, or merely con-
structive possession of these various units located on the 
premises subject to the rights of tenants occupying them. 
The law recognizes that the term "possession" used in a 
written agreement may be so ambiguous and uncertain that 
oral evidence surrounding the making of the provision will 
be admitted to explain and clarify it. That principal of law· 
is stated in 49 C. J. 1092, under section 1 of Possession, as 
follows: 
"Both in common speech and legal terminology, 
there is no word more ambiguous in its meaning than 
'possession', whether considered in its relation to real 
property or personal property, and this ·is especially 
true when it occurs in statutory provisions." 
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Citing Leslie v. Rothes, 2 Ch. 499 at 506, wherein the 
court used the following language: 
"The ambiguous character of the term 'possession' 
is well known, and has been recognized by high authori-
ty. It has several meanings, and it may well have sev-
eral meanings in the same instrument, some of them 
overlapping one another, and some being combina-
tions of more than one." 
See City Nat. Bank v. Folsom, (Tex. Civ:A.) 247 SW 
591, 594. 
Where there is such ambiguity as is apparent in this 
case there is a well recognized exception to the parol evi-
dence rule which permits the receiving of oral evidence to 
explain the ambiguity in writing. The rule is stated in 2 
Jones on Evidence, 4th Ed., section 450, page 861, as fol-
lows: 
" ..... In order to show what was in the minds 
of the parties at the time of executing the instrument, 
parol evidence is admissible where it appears that the 
language of the writing is ambiguous or susceptible of 
more than one interpretation, or where an indispens-
able term or factor cannot be ascertained therefrom 
" 
·See Fox Film Corp. v. Ogden Theater Company, 82 
Utah 279, 17 P2d 294, 90 A.L.R. 1299, wherein oral evidence 
was held proper to explain the understanding of the par-
ties as to the time element for delivery of newsreels under 
the written contract in suit. The rule is well stated by the 
Utah Court in 90 A. L. R. at page 1302, as follows: 
"One well-recognized exception to the above rule 
is that extrinsic evidence, parol or otherwise, is ad-
missible to explain a latent ambiguity in a writing. 
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This does not mean that terms or conditions may be 
inserted into or taken out of the writing by direct oral 
assertions, but it does mean that the court may re--
ceive evidence of such surrounding facts as will enable 
it to look upon the transaction through the eyes of the 
parties thereto and thereby know what they under-
stood or intended the ambiguous word or provisions 
to mean. 4 Jones Comm. on Ev. sec. 1544 et seq. 
" A typical case illustrating the situation in which 
extrinsic evidence may be received to remove ambigui-
ty is Boley v. Butterfield, 57 Utah, 262, 194 P. 128. In 
that case the plaintiff, Boley, leased to defendant, But-
terfield, for a stated rental, 'grazing permit' for a herd 
of sheep. Butterfield refused to pay the rental because 
Boley had prior to making the lease to him leased the 
right to graze sheep on the range in question to anoth-
er sheepman. The lease to defendant did not purport 
to be exclusive, nor did it purport to be nonexclusive. 
It was ambiguous as to the matter in question. In or-
der to determine whether the parties thereto int~nded 
the lease to be exclusive or otherwise, the court ad-
mitted extrinsic evidence to show that defendant be-
fore and at the time this lease was executed knew that 
Boley had leased a grazing right to another sheepman. 
Boley was permitted to testify that he told Butterfield 
of the existing lease before the lease in question was 
executed. Observe that he spoke in the past tense of 
a fact that then existed. 
"It may easily be seen from the above outline of 
the case that, in order to determine what the parties 
to the lease meant and intended as to whether it was to 
be exclusive or otherwise, it was necessary for the 
court to know as much as the parties at the time of 
signing knew about the subject-matter. The evidence 
admitted enabled the court, so far as necessary, to see 
the transaction through the eyes and understanding 
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of the parties. The testimony established a relevant 
fact but did not add a stipulation to the lease." 
"From the record in this case we cannot infer 
that the parties to the contract in question were whol-
ly inexperienced in the moving picture business. From 
what they knew of the business and its custom and 
practice, and of the art of making news reels, the pla-
ces where made, and the customary manner of releas-
ing and transporting the reels from the laboratories 
to the theaters, they undoubtedly had some common 
understanding of the time element implied in the very 
name of the article in question. The court was at lib-
erty to hear evidence of such surrounding facts and 
circumstances and from the same to determine what 
that understanding was. Ingram-Day Lumber Co. v. 
Schultz (C. C. A.) 45 F. (2d) 359 ..... " 
In the Boley case cited in the Fox Film Corp. opinion, 
the court had the following to say at uage 269 of the Utah 
Report: 
"But defendant also insists that the court erred 
in admitting evidence on the part of plaintiffs in sup-
port of their reply. One of the contentions is that pa-
rol evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of a writ-
ten instrument. It is assumed by defendant that the 
instrument in question is unambiguous and self-ex-
planatory. If that were true, defendant's contention 
would be indisputable, but we have already determined 
that there is a latent ambiguity in the instrument as 
to whether or not in conveyed an exclusive permit to 
defendant or a right in common with other parties. 
This ambiguity opened the door for the admission of 
evidence as to the understanding of the parties at the 
time the instrument was executed. The evidence ob-
jected to and admitted was calculated to shed light 
upon the question as to what the parties meant by thl' 
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terms used in the instrument. For that purpose the 
evidence was clearly admissible. It in no manner var-
ied or altered the meaning of the terms used in the 
lease, but tended to explain the sense in which they 
must have been understood by the parties when the 
lease was executed and delivered. 
"That extrinsic evidence may be resorted to to 
explain the meaning of a written instrument in such 
cases is elementary doctrine, and is recognized by this 
court in numerous decisions, some of which respond-
ents have cited in thir brief. Cain v. Hagenbarth, 37 
Utah, 78-79, 106 Pac. 945; Ernst v. Allen, 55 Utah 272, 
184 Pac. at page 831; Brown v. Markland, 16 Utah, 360, 
52 Pac. 597, 67 Am. St. Rep. 629. See also Egelund 
v. Fayter, 51 Utah, at page 58, 172 Pac. 313, where 
numerous other cases are collated. There was no er-
ror in admitting the testimony to which objections 
were made." 
In the case at bar the court's action in denying plain-
tiff's motion to strike, and admitting the oral evidence of 
both plaintiff and defendants of the agreement made prior 
or contemporaneous with the execution of the written con-
tract, was clearly right and proper under the foregoing ex-
ception to the parol evidence rule. This was not done for 
the purpose of varying the terms' of the written contract, 
but rather for the purpose of explaining the ambiguity with 
respect to possession of the store which appeared on the 
face of the agreement itself. Neither the supplemental 
agreement, Exhibit "B", nor the Warranty Deed, Exhibit 
"C", cured the ambiguity, and the only way it could be ex-
plained was by oral evidence of the agreement of the parties 
with respect to the matter, or prior to the making of the 
written agreement. Counsel's argument concerning the 
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warranty of possession under the Utah Statute has no ap-
plication. There is no question but what aa warranty deed 
carries a guarantee of quiet possession, but the Warranty 
Deed in the case at bar was clearly subject to the provision 
as to possession in the written contract, and the meaning 
of that provision could only be ascertained by the receipt 
of extrinsic evidence. 
IV. DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIMED ERROR OF TRIAL COURT FOR FAILURE 
TO AIDMIT PROFFERED EVIDENCE OF SPECIAL 
DAMAGES AND F AlLURE TO FIND ON ALL THE IS-
SUES. 
1. As to the special damage point made by counsel 
(Br. 32) we agree that this claimed error can only be im-
portant if a new trial is granted. The trial court had no 
occasion to assess damages herein because after hearing 
all the evidence he found that plaintiff had failed to make 
his case. The court heard plaintiff's testimony that he had 
advised defendants before the contract was executed that 
he intended to operate a grocery business in the store and 
market his beef therein. The court also heard defendants 
deny that, and testify that plaintiff agreed to take the store 
subject to Haddock's rights (R-135 to 245). The court 
found against the plaintiff on this special damage issue. 
Upon this state of the record there was no need for the ap-
plication of any rule of damages because the court found 
no breach of the contract and therefore no damages suf-
fered by plaintiff. We have no quarrel with the rule of 
<iamages counsel set forth, but we contend that it has no 
application to the facts of this case. We also call attention 
( 
I 
I 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
to the balance of the rule, which counsel omitted, appear-
ing in 15 Am. Jur., page 457, which reads as follows: 
' 
"In order to recover special damages under this 
rule, however, it must appear that at the time of the 
making of the contract the defendant had reasonable 
notice or knowledge of the special conditions rendering 
such damages the natural and probable result of such 
breach. Otherwise, the damages recoverable will be 
limited to those resulting from the ordinary and ob-
vious purpose of the contract and which, in the usual 
course of things, flow from its breach. The damages 
resulting by reason of the existence of the special cir-
cumstances are disallowed in such case, not because 
they are uncertain, consequential, or remote, but be-
cause they cannot be fairly considered to have been 
within the contemplation of the parties when the con-
tract was made as consequences which might result 
from its breach. 
"It must of course appear that the special dam-
ages claimed to have been thus in contemplation in fact 
resulted as the proximate consequence of the breach 
of the contract and would not have occurred had the 
defendant fulfilled it." 
We believe the rule is more correctly and clearly sta-
ted in Restatement of the Law, I Contracts, sections 330 
and 331, pp. 509-520. 
Under these rules, we submit, the court applied the 
proper measure of damages. 
2. We are unable to agree with counsel that the court 
failed to find on all the issues raised by the pleadings. Find-
ing 6, which is complained of, does not stand alone. Find-
ings on all the material issues were made (R-50 to 53) in-
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eluding the making of the sales agreement with plaintiff 
(Exhibits "A", "B", and "C"), that negotiations were had 
prior to the execution of the contract and what plaintiff 
represented to defendants concerning getting Haddock out 
of the store, that defendants executed the agreement rely-
ing on plaintiff's representation and turned over the pos-
session of the property to plaintiff November 1, 1946, sub-
ject to Haddock's rights in the store ,and that the defend-
ants fully performed their agreement. Then the court finds 
as untrue plaintiff's allegations in conflict with the findings 
made, as to the matter of the store occupancy representa-
tions prior to the execution of the contract. Such findings 
do not offend against any of the cases cited by counsel (Br. 
34). We believe the case of Patton v. Kirkman (1946) 109 
Utah 487, 167 P2d 282, sustains our position. This court 
in that case had the following to say: 
"Although it is error for a court to fail to make 
findings on all rna terial issues raised by the pleadings 
this does not mean that the court must negative ev-
ery allegation contained in the pleadings. It is suffi-
cient if from the findings it makes there can be no 
reasonable inference other than that it must have 
found against such allegations. See Piper v. Hatch, 
86 Utah 292, 43 P. 2d 700." 
We submit that from the court's findings in the case at 
bar there can be no conclusion other than that the court 
found against the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint 
and reply. 
We conclude that the court's rulings at the trial on the 
pleadings, and on the admission of evidence are free from 
error; that the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judg-
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ment were made in accordance with competent evidence 
and the law; and that the judgment of the court should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGES. BALLIF, 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
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